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Managing agency for athletic performance: A discursive approach to the zone  
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a discursive perspective on a concept used within sport 
psychology, in both its academic and practical discourse, known as ‘flow’ or the zone. 
This extraordinary state is one of exceptional peak performance whereby the athletes 
claim to perform effortlessly, automatically and successfully. It is the use of the zone  
as a discursive resource in accounting for successful performance that is the focus of 
the paper. Through the examination of two televised accounts of performance from 
elite athletes, I argue that the zone can be used as a way of managing agency for a 
performance – for diluting or softening accounts of success, or as a way of claiming  
probable success when failing due to injury. Finally the paper proposes a number of 
rhetorical contrasts that are evident in the discursive deployment of the zone.  
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Introduction 
The zone in sport science  
This paper offers a discursive interpretation on a concept within sports science 
called the zone. The zone is a term used in sport psychology in both its theories and its 
practical discourse. In academic sport psychology, the original uses of the word zone 
are related to its part in the theory the zone of optimal functioning (Hanin, 1980; Hanin 
& Syrja, 1995). In this case the zone referred to a specific conceptual area related to 
arousal levels. Hanin believed that for each athlete, performance would reach an 
optimal state when anxiety levels remained within a specific zone. The zone could be 
at any point low or high on the anxiety continuum, depending on the individual athlete 
(Kerr, 1997).  Related to Hanin’s theory of the zone of optimal functioning is the 
usage of the term zone in sporting discourse related to exceptional performances and it 
is this which is the focus of the arguments and analysis presented in this paper. 
The specific origins of the zone as it is used in practical sports’ discourse are 
not clear (Shainberg, 1989), although it appears that it has filtered down from Hanin’s 
theory to everyday usage. In sporting discourse the zone is treated as a distinct mental 
state and in this sense, it becomes clearer why the term ‘zone’ is used, as it denotes a 
place (Oxford English Dictionaryi). However, in this case it refers to a mental rather 
than physical place.  This mental place is marked by a number of factors such as being 
relaxed, completely focused and performing effortlessly. Sugarman (1999) offers a 
simple explanation of what being in the zone entails: 
“In the flow, in a groove, on a roll, in the zone - whatever you call it, it’s all 
defining one thing. It’s that special feeling of playing like you can do no wrong and 
everything goes your way. You are so involved in what you are doing that nothing 
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else seems to matter because you are so connected to your task”. (Sugarman, 1999: 
18).  
Although Sugarman’s quote positions the zone and flow as the same 
phenomenon, a distinction can be drawn at times between their discursive usage, and 
their usage in the sport psychology literature. From a discursive psychological 
perspective, the variation in terms is itself open to analysis and supports the notion 
that the zone is not simply, if at all, an actual state of mind and body but rather a 
language phenomenon, and therefore a device for accountability. Linking flow and the 
zone, sport psychologists Lindsay, Maynard and Thomas (2005) suggest that the zone 
is a specific state that has characteristics of what has been termed ‘flow’ by others and 
is  associated with peak performance. There is a variety of terminology linked to the 
zone, and other related terms such as flow states, ideal performance states, peak 
performance and peak experience. Some sport psychologists suggest that the lumping 
together of all these terms clouds “the conceptual clarity of the area” (Lindsay, 
Maynard & Thomas, 2005, p. 164) and that the states differ on the basis of specific 
affective and behavioural criteria Such sport psychologists are, of course, operating 
from the perspective that such states are firstly in existence, and secondly, have 
features that are distinct from one anotherii.  
 
Flow states, the zone and hypnosis 
Much research has been conducted into flow states, beginning with the work 
of Csikszentmihalyi, (1975, 1990, 1997). The flow state “involves total absorption in a 
task, and creating a state of consciousness where optimal levels of functioning often 
occur” (Jackson, 1995: 138), and has typically been measured through the Flow State 
Scale (Jackson & Marsh, 1996) and its new version Flow State Scale-2 (Jackson & 
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Eklund, 2004). Each questionnaire contains 36 items based on nine flow dimensions 
outlined by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) which include: 
 “ intense involvement, deep concentration, clarity of goals and feedback, loss 
of sense of time, lack of self-consciousness and transcendence of a sense of self, 
leading to an autotelic, that is, intrinsically rewarding experience ”(Csikszentmihalyi 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 1988: 365).  
The basis to this questionnaire was Jackson’s (1995) study in which she 
conducted an inductive content analysis of interviews with elite athletes to ascertain 
the factors that influenced and disrupted the flow state. She claimed that flow was 
improved by being motivated, achieving optimal arousal and being focused, and 
harmed by factors including negative interactions with team mates and poor 
environmental conditions.  
Jackson’s aim was to get closer to understanding how to help athletes get into 
the flow state in order to optimise their performance. Jackson found that many of her 
athletes talked about the flow state as being controllable. The notion that flow is 
controllable has influenced a number of popular sports science practical texts that take 
the form of self-help books that claim to offer practical exercises to enable athletes to 
reach the desired zone state (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Murphy & White, 
1995; Nideffer, 1992; Sugarman, 1999).  One such suggestion is to assist in this 
process comes from recent work linking flow states and hypnosis. For example, 
Lindsay, Maynard and Thomas (2005) used a hypnotic intervention (relaxation, 
imagery, hypnotic induction and hypnotic regression) with elite level cyclists. They 
found that the use of hypnosis was associated with an increase in thoughts and 
feelings typically associated with flow states. Similarly, Edgette and Rowan (2003) 
found that athletes who were able to enter hypnotic states at will, found it easier to get 
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into flow and zone states. However, the hypnosis literature suggests that being in a 
hypnotic trance is something that can be enacted and perhaps be used as a means of 
accounting for some kinds of behaviours. Indeed, hypnosis researchers have 
considered how to ascertain genuine changes in experience from those that are 
inauthentic or exaggerated because of the social demands of the situation (Perlini, 
Haley & Buczel, 1998). Wagstaff (1996) and others have suggested that there may be 
an element of compliance with situational demands of what is expected of a hypnotic 
episode by participants when reporting their private experience. Thus suggesting that 
there may be similarities between these different streams of research concerning the 
reporting of subjective experiences and the accountability practices involved when 
doing such reporting. In the case of this paper, the focus is on how claims of being in 
the zone are reported and constructed by athletes in order to manage accounting for 
success and failure.  
 
Qualitative research in sport psychology 
Until recently sport psychology relied heavily on the use of quantitative 
methodologies to approach data analysis. Although qualitative studies are beginning 
to creep in, as Culver, Gilbert and Trudel (2003) note, over a decade (1990-1999) in 
three prominent sport psychology journals, only 84 of the 485 published articles used 
qualitative methodologies, with the majority of these using content analysis. One 
reason put forward for this is that many of the qualitative methodologies give little in 
terms of prediction or readily applicable practical solutions (Locke, 2003), as sport 
psychology in particular is a practical disciplineiii.  
In more recent years both sport and exercise psychology have seen a slow and 
quiet infiltration of constructionist methodologies, beginning with a paper by 
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McGannon and Mauws (2000) proposing a Foucauldian discursive psychological 
perspective to study exercise adherence. This was followed by a flurry of papers 
proposing methodologies including narrative analysis (Smith & Sparkes, 2002, 2004, 
2005), interpretative phenomenological analysis (Nicholls, Holt & Polman, 2005), 
conversation analysis (Faulkner & Finlay, 2002: Jimmerson, 2001) and discursive 
psychology (Locke, 2003, 2004). The advent of qualitative methodologies have begun 
to challenge some of the theoretical safe grounds in sports science. The topics 
investigated have been diverse, ranging from mental states such as attribution (Finlay 
& Faulkner, 2003; Locke, 2004) and emotion (Locke, 2003), to locker room bonding 
(Jimmerson, 2001) and spinal cord injuries (Smith & Sparkes, 2002, 2004).  
With regards to qualitative research related to flow states or the zone, there are 
a limited number of studies, which in the main rely on content analyses, to look at 
various dimensions of the flow experience (Jackson, 1996; Young, 1999). A notable 
exception to these is a study by Sparkes and Partington (2003) who looked at flow 
experiences in a canoeing club. Using a narrative analytic perspective, they noted that 
there were different positions and narratives genres open to men and women, and that 
due to the hierarchical, male dominated club culture that certain hero or epic narrative 
structures tended not to be used by the women in their stories. They suggest that 
telling a flow or zone narrative: 
“is a communicative and relational act. It is a performance that requires 
narrative skills in terms of, for example, the strategic selection of narrative topics, the 
use of particular metaphors, and the ability to work to a particular plot in a way that 
maintains dramatic tension” (page 312).  
The work presented in this paper differs from the narrative analytic perspective 
proposed by Sparkes and Partingdon (2003) in that the focus here is on the discursive 
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performance of talking about zone states, and looking at what such accounts may 
accomplish interactionally for the speaker when discussing athletic performances.  
The following section outlines specifically what a discursive approach to sport 
psychology entails (see Locke, 2004 for further discussion on this).  
 
A discursive approach to sport psychology: The zone as a discursive resource 
Sport psychology, as does much of mainstream psychology, sits against a 
backdrop of cognitivism.  Athletes are seen as active organisms who search, filter, 
selectively act on, reorganise and create information (Straub & Williams, 1984). 
Thereby sport psychology justifies its very existence on the premise that at the elite 
level of sport, physically and technically everyone can be considered more or less 
equal in terms of ability, and it is the mental side that makes the difference. In some 
senses then, sport psychology by its very invention invokes a kind of lay Cartesian 
dualism – that mind and body are separate, but closely linked. More specifically it 
invokes two fundamental principles. Firstly, that the mind can control the body, and 
secondly, that the mind must be controlled or trained in order not to have an adverse 
effect on the body. Sports performers aiming for their optimum performance must, 
according to sports psychologists, reach a psychological state that will facilitate this 
exceptional level of performance, and it is the attainment of this desired state that has 
been called the zone.  
A discursive psychological analysis of sport data stands in direct contrast to 
the more traditional work in the area of sport science. In much sport research the 
interview interactions would initially have been treated as participants reporting some 
reality regarding their descriptions of events, thoughts and feelings about a particular 
issue and the context of the talk may have been ignored. From a discursive 
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perspective, accounts of performances can be analysed in order to investigate how 
participants rhetorically construct events in order to manage their accountability. As 
has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Locke, 2004), such an approach offers the researcher a 
method for understanding interactions across a diverse range of settings in sport 
research, for example, analysing discourse from coaching sessions, recording team 
sport interactions or asking athletes to talk about their performances.  
As the very definition of sport psychology demonstrates, it is readily 
applicable to a discursive psychological reanalysis. By focusing on the mental side of 
sporting performance, sport psychology invokes a rich interactional currency of 
mental terms and uses such concepts within both its academic writings and practical 
applications for sport performers. Commonly used terms within sport psychology’s 
academic writings refer to assumed mental states and typically include asking 
performers to recollect their memories and feelings surrounding past performances; 
considering the ways in which athletes attribute success and failure; and talking about 
coping strategies in order to control emotions, such as anxiety. Each of these areas 
assumes the presumed existence of these mental states that we can access in an 
unproblematic (and uncontroversial) way, and each can thus be reassessed from a 
discursive psychological perspective.   
Discursive Psychology (DP) is a broad approach resting on 
ethnomethodological principles, and using in the main the methods typically 
associated with discourse analysis (see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987), rhetorical analysis (Billig, 1985, 1996), and some of the principles developed 
from conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992) and membership categorisation analysis 
(Hester & Eglin, 1997; Sacks, 1992).   In basic terms it has been described as the 
application of discourse analysis to the study of psychological phenomena. However, 
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such a crude generalization does not quite grasp all that DP can do as a 
methodological approach. As a term it was originally coined by Edwards & Potter 
(1992) and marked the beginning of a thorough reworking of much of psychology’s 
subject matter, hence the often crude generalizations of it. Edwards & Potter (2005) 
(see also Potter & Edwards, 2003) outline three overlapping strands of discursive 
psychology. These ranged from a discursive reworking of traditional psychological 
models, to looking at the interactional and rhetorical uses of psychological terms, and 
finally studying where psychological states are implied in discourse.  Psychological 
strongholds such as memory and cognition (Bogen & Lynch, 1989; Middleton & 
Edwards, 1990), emotions (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Locke & Edwards, 2003), 
attributions (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and identity (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; 
Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995) have been subject to a thorough reworking from a 
discursive point of view, with the result that ascriptions of mental states were 
considered for their role as interactional currency. In more recent years this work has 
crossed over into the sport psychology arena with a number of papers using a 
discursive psychological perspective to sport talk, including offering a reworking on 
attribution theory in order to explain or justify sporting performance (Finlay & 
Faulkner, 2003; Locke, 2004), to challenging sport psychology’s over reliance on the 
concept of anxiety and instead focusing on the interactional currency of emotion terms 
in accounts of performance (Locke, 2003).  
The focus of this paper is on how accounts of being in the zone are constructed 
by the participants to perform specific interactional business.  It is proposed that on a 
basic level the zone can provide athletes with a discursive absence of agency for their 
performance. Agency in this context is seen as a discursive achievement. Stainton 
Rogers (2003) claims that “[a]gency is the location of the cause of an effect” (page 
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310). For the purpose of this paper, agency is regarded as the discursive construction 
of locating the cause (zone) of an effect (exceptional sporting performance). 
Discursive psychology as a methodology enables us to examine the “situated, 
occasioned, rhetorical uses of the rich common sense psychological lexicon” 
(Edwards & Potter, 2005: 241).  Thus, we can ascertain how issues of agency are dealt 
with through descriptions of actions, events and dispositions.iv  
 
Method 
The material used in this study is taken from a science documentary series 
“Equinox” called “Losing It” that was aired on British Television (Channel Four) in 
the Autumn of 1997. This programme focused on sport psychologists and their work 
with elite sports performers, with specific reference to the zone.  Of particular interest 
were narratives of performance from two elite athletes, Sally Gunnell and Derek 
Redmond. Sally Gunnell was a British athlete, a 400m hurdler, who after the race she 
discusses in this programme (World Championship 400m final, 1993) was 
simultaneously the reigning Olympic, World and Commonwealth champion. Derek 
Redmond was a 400m sprinter. His career was marked by a number of serious 
injuries, including his most famous failure, the 1992 Olympic semi-final 400m race in 
Barcelona, the race he narrates in this paper.  
The programme was video-recorded and transcribed using conventions 
established for conversation analysis by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson & Heritage, 
1984). The resulting transcript was read repeatedly in conjunction with the video data, 
and analyzed using a discursive psychological approach (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 
2001, 2005; Potter & Edwards, 2003) focusing on the invocation of mental states and 
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their role in the resulting narrative. v  The full accounts from Gunnell and Redmond 
are situated in the appendices.  
 
Analysis 
The analysis will focus on a number of discursive themes that were evident in 
the accounts of performance. These include how the zone is used to account for 
success and failure; how invocation of the zone in accounting for performance 
removes or softens agency; links between zone talk and modesty; claims of 
remembering and forgetting; the uses of supernatural metaphors; and lastly, how 
rationality and irrationality are constructed. For the purpose of the analysis, two 
performance accounts will be used to demonstrate any claims made and these are 
grouped under three main themed headings: memory disavowals in accounts of 
performance; managing agency for performance: ‘doing modesty’ in the zone; and, 
using the zone in accounts of failure:  mental success, physical failure. Due to the 
storied nature of the accounts for performance, the extracts are dealt with one 
narrative at a time, working through Sally Gunnell’s account before moving on to 
Derek Redmond’s, although the analysis is not always sequential.  
 
Memory disavowals in accounts of performance 
Prior to extract 1, the presenter Brian Moore, the programme’s narrator and 
Sally Gunnell (SG) have talked about how Gunnell went into the race suffering from a 
cold, with Gunnell talking about covering up her illness and acting as if she felt 
normal. The out of the ordinary nature of her performance does not come into the 
account until later. In contrast, this opening scene has been set for the notion that what 
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is going on in Gunnell’s head is normal, rational and mundane. Extract 1 is where the 
race begins and she constructs her experience of the race situation. 
 
Extract 1 – Equinox: Sally Gunnell  
29 SG:  it’s weird really but u:m (0.2) yo:u (1.0) totally forget 
30  everything (.) I I can’t really (.) recall why I mean its 
31  probably only ever happened to me probably twice in my  
32  whole (0.6) career  
 
Prior to this extract, Gunnell has talked about feeling unwell. This extract 
moves on to the mystical or out of the ordinary elements of her account. She begins by 
aligning herself as normal by finding what she claims happened to her as weird (line 
29) before moving onto a generalized and scripted account  (Edwards, 1994, 1997) in 
that “yo:u (1.0) totally forget everything”. As the analysis will demonstrate, such 
claims of not being able to remember are common place from Gunnell when 
accounting for performance (cf. Middleton & Edwards, 1990; on memory as a 
participant’s discourse category). This memory disavowal, combined with the script 
formulations, construct Gunnell’s claims as to this weird experience as what generally 
happens in this kind of situation, rather than her specific personal and subjective 
experience of it. Her phrasing is marked by the use of the extremes  “totally” and 
“everything”. The “yo:u” once more, along with the script formulation, situates the 
account as possibly happening to anybody and not specifically herself and the 
construction of totally forgetting makes her account mysterious and out of the 
ordinary. However, throughout her narrative, she is careful that whilst talking about 
this extraordinary experience, she constructs herself as rational and normal within the 
situation. The extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986)  – “totally” “everything” 
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“whole” help to build the extraordinariness and abnormality of her account.  The 
inference presented is that what Gunnell achieved in this race because of her prior 
illness was beyond her normal performance ability, and as such it constructs this 
special (zone) state.  
In Gunnell’s account, her physical sporting ability is not in question as it is 
common knowledge and previously stated in the programme that in the year of 
competition, she was one of the best hurdlers in the world. Thus, the use of her having 
a cold is crucial for a ‘zone’ account, because it provides a reason for her performing 
at an extraordinary level whilst claiming illness.  Finally she constructs this state she 
achieved as very special, in that it happened on only two previous occasions during 
(again in extreme terms) her “whole career” (line 32).  
There appears to be a rhetoric of control related to flow states, whereby some 
athletes, for example those in Jackson’s (1995) data, suggest that they may be 
controllable states (cf. Redmond’s remembering of the race). Whereas others, for 
example, Sally Gunnell in the data presented here, suggest that it is something that 
happens, that they themselves have no control over and indeed have no recollection 
off that happens to them rather than they are actively controlling it.  This, rather than 
being contradictory aspects of the zone phenomenon, point to the discursive flexibility 
and rhetorical contrasts of the concept. Extract 2 develops this furthervi.  
 
Extract 2 – Equinox: Sally Gunnell  
34 SG: but I don’t (0.8) ever remember (0.8) coming off (.)  
35  the last  (1.0) hurdle and and knowing that she was there 
36  (.) and this is what happened she was actually right  
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37  ahead of me and she was ahead of me all the way in but I 
38  don’t (0.6) remember this and it was only me sort of like 
39  fighting and going over the line and (0.8) y’know I  
40  stood over the line and it was like (1.0) my life was  
41  almost starting again (.) it had almost been on hold for 
42  that last (0.4) y’know fifty two (.) seven seconds  
 
 Once more, Gunnell’s account of the race is marked by her not remembering 
(lines 34, 38) what happened and in this extract she contrasts what her subjective 
experience of the race was (lines 34-35) with what actually happened, and is being 
shown on the television screen while she is talking vii. As discursive analyses 
demonstrate, everyday categories of “remember” and “recall” are not simply 
references to inner psychological states, but have some interactional currency and 
rhetorical use in managing accountability in discourse (see Coulter, 1990; Locke & 
Edwards, 2003; Lynch & Bogen, 1996). As has been claimed elsewhere “memory 
limitations feature as a rhetorical resource, in avoiding accountability for forgotten 
actions, in reflexively displaying concern for strict accuracy and in providing plausible 
deniability” (Locke & Edwards, 2003, p. 243).   Gunnell gives a description of the 
actual race and then contrasts this with her subjective recollection of the race in line 
38 where she reiterates that she does not “remember” what happened. Her memory 
disavowal builds into the mystical element of her account which is further verified by 
her extreme statement that her “life was almost starting again”. The “almost” serves to 
soften this statement as otherwise it may appear as too extraordinary and open to 
challenge (cf. Edwards, 2000 on ECFs, softeners and doing non-literal), and the next 
“almost” does the same, where in lines 41 and 42, she continues that her life had 
“almost been on hold” followed by a specific recollection of her race time. The 
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softener “almost” enables her to maintain a rational, non-extreme perspective whilst 
saying extraordinary things. 
After this account of her subjective experience of the race where she claims to 
not remember, contrasted with what actually happened, Gunnell moves on to what she 
can remember once the race had ended.  Her construction of not knowing what 
happened during the race ties into her account of being in a mystical, zone state, 
marked by not recalling events. Extract 3 picks up this up further.   
 
Extract 3 – Equinox: Sally Gunnell  
44 SG: and it was like “well what’s happened” (.) y’know I  
45  didn’t know that I’d actually won (.) and that I’d  
46  actually broken the world record everyone thought “oh  
47  she’s very calm” y’know (.) “she’s just walking around”  
48  (0.2) but I was looking to see you know what actually  
49  happened in that race (.) I had no idea it was as though 
50  I’d just run my own (.) >y’know< (.)  tunnel vision all 
51  the way round I don’t remember any of it  
 
Gunnell begins with actively voicing her thoughts (“well what’s happened”) 
once the race was over in line 44 and claims that “I didn’t know that I’d actually won” 
(line 45) and she uses her experiences of the race here in direct contrast to what 
spectators may have thought. As Wooffitt (1992) notes in his work on accounts of 
paranormal experience, active voicing can be used to warrant storied accounts as 
perceptually veridical, being now recalled with an experiential quality as if re-
experienced. In the case of this extract, Gunnell uses her out of the ordinary mental 
state of not knowing what happened in the race (“well what’s happened” line 44) to 
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directly contrast with a generalised “everyone” (line 46) who thought that she was 
very “calm” (line 47) and “just walking around” (line 47). Gunnell explains that in 
fact she was attempting to find out the race result, because she did not know that she 
had won. She claims that she had “tunnel vision” (line 50) and she did not “remember 
any of it” (line 51), linking in with her reported thoughts in line 44.  Her display here 
of not being able to recall the result further bolsters her claims of not being fully 
conscious of her actions throughout race.  Her construction of events is extreme, noted 
in part by the uses of extreme case formulations such as “any of it” and it is this 
extremity that marks the race as out of the ordinary and lays the foundations for 
claims of being in a special ‘zone’ state.  
 
Managing agency for performance: ‘Doing modesty’ in the zone 
Elsewhere it has been noted that when accounting for performance athletes 
may ‘do modesty’ in order to play down their successful achievements (Finlay & 
Faulkner, 2003; Locke, 2001, 2004). Gunnell’s account is set up to do just this. As the 
analysis demonstrates, throughout the narrative she does not openly claim full 
responsibility for her exceptional performance in this race. As we know from the 
programme prior to the extract, it was in this race that although Gunnell was suffering 
from a bad cold, she won the gold medal and broke the world record.  
Throughout Gunnell’s account, she constructs the events of the race as to 
enable a removal of agency for her actions, and that she was in a passive state, and 
unable to consciously recall her performance. This enables her to manage the 
problematic nature of accounting for outstanding success and “do modesty”. One way 
to accomplish this is to appeal to the notion that it is unconscious or subconscious, to 
be unable to recall these extraordinary events, whilst still retaining some personal 
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agency, as we have seen in extracts 1-3. Another, and linked rhetorically to the former 
is to invoke an external agent, such as a supernatural or mystical element as part of the 
zone account in order to bolster this account for this extraordinary event. Gunnell’s 
account holds all of these elements. She uses both the agentive and passive, with the 
agentive being done by her use of softeners on many of the passive components. By 
using softeners on the passive components it enables to ascertain that Gunnell 
although playing it down, was agentive and responsible for her performance.  
The language and metaphors used throughout the account help to build up the 
extraordinariness of what happened and extract 4 demonstrates some of these 
metaphorical constructions in action.  
 
Extract 4 – Equinox: Sally Gunnell 
70 BM:  and it’s almost like a religious experience  
71 SG:  yeah you feel as though someone’s almost (.) helping you 
72  I must admit just because it (.) it does feel so alien  
73  (.) at times (.) y’know as I said before it  
74  doesn’t actually (.)  particularly feel like (.) me out 
75  there and you almost get into its like a tr↑a↓nce (.) and 
76  uh you feel as though someone y’know I always said (.)  
77  someone’s watching you and just sort of like you know (.) 
78  pulling you round (.) the track and and and (0.2) and  
79  letting you flow around that track yeah it’s a yeah (.) 
80  it is (.) an amazing feeling 
 
Brian Moore as interviewer and narrator (BM), constructs what Gunnell has 
portrayed as “almost like a religious experience” (line 70) to build up the mysticism of 
the zone. He uses “almost” to soften what is hearably an extreme statement. Gunnell 
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uptakes on what Moore is suggesting and although not using his religious terms, 
answers in generalised terms that describe elements of religious experience - “you feel 
as though someone’s almost (.) helping you” (line 71), before moving on to her 
personal experience and feelings about the situation, that it feels “so alien” (line 72) at 
times.  “Almost” (as used in lines 71 and 75) is a useful word for Gunnell because it 
plays down the notion that she is being literal that someone helped her and perhaps 
fends off the notion that she is making a serious claim that she was not responsible for 
winning the race, whilst still softening her agency and making it easier to talk about 
her success. In addition, she uses other softeners such as “at times” (line 73), 
“particularly” (line 74), “like a” (line 75) and “sort of like” (line 77). The use of 
softeners also enable Gunnell to construct herself as rational in an irrational and 
mystical situation. These softeners orient to her being a normal rational person who 
although making extraordinary claims in this account, is not usually predisposed to 
(Edwards, in press). 
The use of metaphors in this extract are important to its construction as 
mystical and out of the ordinary. Moore invokes “religious experience” (line 70), 
whilst Gunnell invokes “alien” (line 72), “tr↑a↓nce” (line 75), “flow”(line 79) and  
“pulling you round (.) the track” (line 78). This constructs the notion of being in the 
zone as something that you yourself are not fully agentive and responsible for, and 
places the agency elsewhere, or at least consciously removed from you.  
Gunnell’s handling of agency in her performance narrative is interesting. On 
the one hand it seems that she was not responsible for winning. Through her 
construction of events, her lack of conscious memory of the race, and her use of 
metaphors and softeners, Gunnell is able to manage talking about her success. As 
noted, she utilises softeners throughout the extract, most notably “almost”. The 
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remaining part of the narrative contains more of these softeners, for example, 
“almost”(line 75), and there placing here is crucial. It appears that Gunnell uses her 
construction of events attributing it to mystical experience to manage the problematic 
nature of accounting for her success and to “do modesty”. Further evidence is given 
for this in line 74 where she argues that it does not “particularly feel like me out there” 
and there are links with her previous construction of “almost (.) helping you” (line 
71).  
Her construction of events leads to two positions. Firstly, that this exceptional 
state and its associated results could have happened to anybody. In direct contrast is 
the second position whereby her use of softeners such as “particularly” (line 74) work 
against this construction, and suggest that Gunnell was agentive in her performance. 
These constructions enable Gunnell to perform modesty for her performance, the 
result is known and by seemingly removing some agency for her performance, she 
manages the problematic nature of accounting for her success. Her uses of softeners 
such as “almost” are producing her as a normal rational individual who is not disposed 
to making bizarre mystical claims but finds herself having to go along with them on 
this occasion. This is further backed up by her conclusions in lines 79-80 whereby she 
has to agree with Moore that “yeah (.) it is (.) an amazing feeling”. This final 
statement is constructed by Gunnell as if concluding from the evidence of what 
happened to her.  
She claims further that it is like a “tr↑a↓nce” (line 75). Her delivery here 
marked by the rising and falling intonation is performative. Gunnell reflexively 
indexes her own rationality by enacting the extraordinariness of what she is claiming. 
Linked to this are the use of extreme case formulation softeners such as “almost get 
into it’s like a trance” (line 75) which index the speaker as not disposed to making 
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extraordinary claims. Note the similarities in language to hypnotic accounts, in 
particular with Gunnell’s use of “tr↑a↓nce” and her prior claims of not being able to 
remember.  
Gunnell continues in a generalised scripted account that “you feel” before 
reformulating this as a personalised and long-held notion - “ I always said” (line 76). 
This scripted formulation as something that is long-held by her, adds further 
credibility to her claims. She reverts to Moore’s prior formulation as the zone state as 
a “religious experience” (line 70) when she suggests that she feels like “someone’s 
watching you” (line 77) and “pulling you round (.) the track” (line 78) and “letting 
you flow” (line 79). Her generalised and scripted version (cf. Edwards, 1994 on script 
formulations) here once more suggests that this something that could happen to 
anyone, and not necessarily her. One result of this scripting is that it again bolsters her 
rationality whilst making what may be seen as irrational claims. In addition, her 
agency is further removed by her description of what happens “pulling” and “letting 
you flow”, suggest that it is a higher or mystical force rather than her, that enabled the 
final result. The use of “letting you flow” is a passive construction. “Flow”, along 
with its usage as a mental state, is a word conventionally used for natural athleticism 
and flowing round the track is a desirable state. It describes a natural process, 
something that is happening rather than something that Gunnell is consciously doing. 
Finally, she says that it is an “amazing feeling” (line 80) and again this formulation is 
extreme and marks it as out of the ordinary. This statement is produced as an 
unsoftened conclusion, and as a kind of recognition or agreement, most notably 
through her use of “yeah” (line 79), whereby displaying her carefulness is using those 
descriptions but is finally driven to agree with what has been constructed “yeah..it is 
(.) an amazing feeling”.  
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Through Gunnell’s invocation of this extraordinary state, she is able to claim 
success without arrogance, as she was operating semi-consciously, on automatic pilot 
if you like. This is a way for the athlete to reduce their agency and responsibility for 
the performance. There are many other ways of doing being modest and many other 
notions of agency and discourse around this area that the athletes can draw upon. For 
example, perhaps another method used by athletes to claim such success could be the 
idea of luck (Locke, 2004).  
 
Using the zone in accounts of failure:  Mental success, physical failure 
The zone is part of a narrative of success that downplays agency, whilst 
strongly upgrading the claimed performance, enabling the speaker to make immodest 
claims modestly. Gunnell’s narrative is a clear account for success and the result is 
given that she broke the world record and became World Champion. But what of the 
contrast case of Derek Redmond who invokes the zone immediately in his narrative of 
performance, yet the result was that he lost the race? Redmond’s is also an account for 
success, but it was potential success, with his failure attributed to physical injury.   
 
Extract 5 - Equinox: Derek Redmond 
9 BM: despite a career plagued by injury (.) Derek Redmond  
10  began the semi-final of the four hundred metres in  
11  Barcelona in nineteen ninety two (0.4) 
12  as a strong favourite (0.4) not only for a  
13  final place (0.6) but for a medal 
14 DR:  I was in the zone heh heh heh heh I was (.) everything  
15  had gone right (.) yeah at the start I said on your marks 
16  ((clips))  
17 DR: and I knew I’d won it 
18  ((clips)) 
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19 DR: mentally I’d (0.2) I’d won the race  
 
Brian Moore as the programme’s commentator, narrates the voiceover that sets 
up Redmond’s account that although Redmond had been “plagued by injury” (line 9) 
throughout his career, he began the race as a “strong favourite” (line 12) for a medal. 
Moore has previously discussed reaching this optimal level of control and then puts 
this in stark contrast if we imagine that the rewards of this might be “snatched from 
you” (line 7). Thus, Derek Redmond in this account holds the category entitlement 
(Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1992) to speak as a person who has experienced that potential 
scenario.   
Redmond’s begins his race narrative in line 14 and he explicitly claims that he 
was “in the zone”. This is a hearably extreme and problematic statement and his 
laughter immediately afterwards displays an orientation to various kinds of 
interactional delicacy. There are two kinds of delicacy being managed by Redmond 
here, those of otherwise being seen as immodest and irrational, and he has to manage 
these through his narrative construction of events. 
He continues with the extreme formulation that “everything had gone right” 
(lines 14-15) referring perhaps to his race preparation. The mysticism of the zone 
comes in lines 16 and 17 where on the starting blocks he claims “I knew I’d won it” 
(line 16) before the race had even begun and then the reformulation of this to 
“mentally…I’d won the race” (line 17). There is interactional delicacy here for 
Redmond to not appear as arrogant and irrational, and these are the kinds of 
interactional matters that athletes handle when accounting for success, as Gunnell has 
demonstrated. There is a play-off between claiming their ultimate performance whilst 
doing modesty at the same time. Redmond’s reformulation of “knew” (line 17) to 
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“mentally” (line 19) may be due to this being a retrospective account that he did not 
win the race due to a physical problem and thus the “mentally” is in direct contrast to 
the actual physical. This mind-body distinction is crucial as Redmond is constructing 
an account for what would otherwise have been success, without the physical injury. 
How can he claim to know that he would have won the race? The zone makes his 
account possible, due to this mystical state whereby ultimate and exceptional 
performance is attained. The extreme case formulations throughout this extract, for 
example, in lines 14-15 “everything had gone right” enable Redmond to maximise this 
claim and evidence it. He goes on to construct this evidence in extract 6.  
 
Extract 6 – Equinox: Derek Redmond 
21 DR: and I was just (.) floating down the back straight I felt 
22  like I was running on air (.) I look at the film now (.) 
23  just the way I was running was absolutely brilliant  
 
Redmond provides a description of how he was running and uses the 
metaphors of “floating down the back straight” (line 21) as if he was “running on air” 
(line 22). These metaphors propose a lack of effort required by Redmond to win the 
race due to him being in the zone. There is a reflexive element to his account that 
further bolsters his credibility of making extreme claims of winning the race, and this 
is evidenced in line 22, “I look at the film now”. Redmond is watching his 
performance on the screen while producing his narrative and this adds a public-private 
dimension to his account. He is not claming extremities that can not be verified. As he 
constructs his account, not only are these things that he believed in his head, by 
watching the race again, and viewers of the programme also doing so, corroboration is 
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available for how well he was running. Both Gunnell and Redmond attend to the 
rhetorical difficulty of making a big claim of this kind based on nothing but subjective 
thoughts. Redmond has his own memories of the event and the footage of the race to 
back up these claims, and he explicitly makes the film evidence relevant in his 
narrative.   
One aspect of claiming to be in the zone is the depiction of irrational or 
extraordinary thoughts at the time. As we saw in extract 3, Gunnell actively voiced her 
thoughts and those of others around her, to explain her behaviour or reactions 
immediately following her performance, claiming that she had no recollection of the 
race. Note that in direct contrast to this, Redmond provides us with a detailed account 
of his (constructed) thoughts and feelings for each part of his race and displays his 
irrational thinking at the time of his injury. Extract 7 picks this up further. 
 
Extract 7 – Equinox: Derek Redmond 
25 DR: and all of a sudden I heard a (0.2) what I thought was a 
26  g↑un shot from the crowd (.) u::m (.) carried on running  
27  next thing you know (.) (that-) I thought somebody had  
28  shot me and I thought I’d been shot in the back of the  
29  l↑eg and (0.4) that was it y’know your hamstring  
30  goes there’s nothing you can do you go up and you come  
31  straight back down again (.) game over  
 
Redmond predicates his account with “all of a sudden” (line 25) which 
prefaces that something is about to happen before moving on to saying that he heard 
what he “thought was a g↑un shot from the crowd” (line 26). This notion of hearing a 
gun shot is dramatic and rhetorically potent. His use of “thought” here bolsters his 
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claim that he was in the zone, because it evidences that he was not thinking in a 
mundane or rational way. Redmond’s account of his injury is constructed as extreme 
and takes on many of the forms of a device first proposed by Sacks ‘at first I 
thought….and then I realized’  (Jefferson, 2004viii; Sacks, 1984). More specifically, 
Redmond’s constructions are an inversion of the  “I was just doing x…when 
extraordinary” formula that Wooffitt (1991, 1992) has examined in accounts of 
paranormal experiences. The inversion is a marked difference in the accounting 
structures. Wooffitt’s participants set up the previous situation as mundane in order 
for them to account for these strange supernatural experiences, whereas Redmond’s 
account has previously been set up as extreme in order for him to visibly demonstrate 
that he was in the zone, thus the “extraordinary y” precedes the “mundane x”. The 
extraordinary y is that he claims to have heard a “g↑un shot” in the crowd and then 
after feeling pain, claims that he thought he had been and “shot in the back of the 
l↑eg” (line 28).  He then moves his account from the extreme to the mundane in lines 
29-30 whereby he had not been shot, instead he had pulled a hamstring. This inversion 
demonstrates the strength of the “x…y” device. In terms of paranormal data, it is used 
to situate the narrator as normal before the experience occurred, whereas in 
Redmond’s account his irrational “y” thinking is used to evidence his claims of being 
in the zone, and that because he was in the zone, without the injury, he would have 
won the race.  
As Edwards (in press) notes, one thing that these normalizing devices do is to 
“manage subjectivity in the course of relating a potentially dubious factual account” 
(page 4). That is, by setting the speaker up as normal, the devices detract against any 
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suggestions that the person claiming such extraordinary things is not usually disposed 
to do so.  
When describing his injury in lines 29-31, Redmond changes from a 
personalised account of what he was thinking to a scripted, generalised account of 
what a hamstring injury means to anyone, “there’s nothing you can do” (line 30), 
before giving a description of how it affects the running action “you go up and you 
come straight back down again”. Finally, he gives the stark, idiomatic result of such 
an injury on an athlete in a race, “game over” (line 31).  
Redmond’s narrative has moved from the extremity of a zone account (and its 
associated irrational thinking) to the mundane reality of the injury that ended his race. 
Extract 8 continues on this theme with Redmond’s account of his thoughts 
immediately after the injury occurred. 
 
Extract 8 - Equinox: Derek Redmond 
33 DR:  I remember (0.2) getting up (0.2) and thinking “if you  
34  get up now (.) you can still qualify” (.) and they’ve got  
35  fifty metres to go and they’re all flying (.) I’ve got  
36  two hundred and fifty metres to go and three hamstrings 
37  (.) and I’m still thinking that I can qualify [I ] 
38 BM:             [you]  
39  really believed that you could still get through  
40 DR:  >if you had come up to me then and said I’d bet you  
41  anything you won’t<  (.) you- you can’t qualify I would 
42  have said (.) you’re on (.) I honestly felt (.) I 
43  could still qualify (.)  
44 BM:  ((glossing)) Redmond was so deeply in the zone (.) that 
45  his mind simply refused to accept what his body was  
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46  telling him  
 
Once more, in direct contrast to Gunnell’s performance narrative, Redmond 
continues to construct his thoughts during the race and he does so as irrational. 
Redmond claims that he thought that he could “get up…and still qualify” (line 34).  
He evidences the impossibility of this situation and the irrationality of this thought in 
the next line where it transpires that at this point due to his injury, he was two hundred 
yards behind the others with “three hamstrings” (line 36), before situating his thoughts 
at that moment of the race “I’m still thinking that I can qualify” (line 37). This 
construction is set up to demonstrate that Redmond was indeed in the zone. His 
description of his irrational thoughts are testament to this, and he invokes a mind-body 
dualism - his mind wished to carry on the race and believed it could, but his body was 
unable to run. Redmond’s construction of his responses are somewhat irrational, that 
he was not thinking normally, and the implicit reason for this being that he was in the 
zone. Moore asks in lines 38-39 if Redmond “really believed” that he could qualify 
and Redmond’s answer is situated as his thinking at that moment of the race “>if you 
had come up to me then” (line 40), before moving on to his thoughts “I honestly felt 
(.) I could still qualify” (lines 42-43).  
The perceived irrationality of his thoughts serve to support his claim that he 
was in the zone, and this is explicitly stated by Moore in the following lines where he 
provides a gloss on what Redmond has discussed. He builds up the mind-body conflict 
and claims that Redmond was in the zone to such an extent that “his mind simply 
refused to accept what his body was telling him” (lines 45-46).   
 
Discussion 
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The zone as an accounting device for athletic performance 
The analysis has demonstrated how the zone is used by athletes to account for 
athletic performance. Although the race results were very different, both of the 
accounts were constructed as accounts of success. Gunnell’s account is one of clear 
success and as the analysis has demonstrated she carefully manages and softens her 
agency for the result throughout her narrative. In direct contrast, Redmond’s account 
is one of mental success but physical failure. Redmond’s account has some stark 
contrasts to Gunnell’s, demonstrated, for example, by his invocation of the zone by 
name straight away, whereas Gunnell describes what are taken (by the programme 
makers) to be characteristics of the zone state. In terms of the zone as a discursive 
resource, the injury and the zone are not separate parts of Redmond’s account. The 
injury and his constructed reactions to it are designed to portray him as being in the 
zone. Part of his grounds for talking credibly about the zone is the fact that he was 
injured. As previously mentioned, he needs to claim he was in the zone to claim that 
he knew he would have won the race if he had not been injured. Invoking the zone 
avoids his claim that he would have won the race being attributed to mere arrogance.  
As an accounting device, zone talk has a kind of dual status. On the one hand it 
is subjective and personalised and a state ‘where you just know these things’ and thus 
claims are not wholly open to critique. On the other, accounts of being in the zone can 
be scripted and generalized to potentially anyone (note the uses of a generalized “you” 
throughout the data extracts and the use of the recognized term ‘zone’ itself). So zone 
talk, like psychological talk generally, provides a way of making personal experiences 
publicly accountable.  
Zone talk trades on a rhetorically useful discourse of a split within the self, 
whether between mind and body (Cartesian dualism), or parts of the mind. The zone 
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makes possible this notion that there are different parts of your mind and body, which 
can be split up or compartmentalized, as demonstrated in Redmond’s account between 
the mental and physical or the mind and body, and his active voicing of his conscious 
thoughts throughout the race. However, in sports talk there is another view of the zone 
that is presented and that is that there are normally separate and often conflicting 
domains of mind and body. In the zone or flow state however, they are in unity, and 
such unity contributes to an outstanding athletic performance. This rests on the 
concept of the zone as being constructed as automatic actions but based on there being 
no separation between mind (will, intention, thought) and body. This rhetorical usage 
of the zone was evident through Gunnell’s narrative, whereby she claimed to have no 
recollection of events and was operating on a kind of auto-pilot. These contrasting 
uses of the zone or flow state demonstrate its flexibility as an accounting device for 
sports performers. 
There are other options available to the athlete when accounting for success 
and failure such as ‘doing modesty’ when winning, or blaming others or 
circumstances when losing, and the zone is another, more extreme, device used in this 
accounting process. Rhetorically, zone talk enables the athlete to remove agency and 
‘do modesty’ when they have won, but as Redmond demonstrates, it is also a way of 
claiming that they could have won, a normally problematic claim when they are 
unable to prove it. The uses of different devices were discovered through analysis of 
the zone narratives. These included constructing the accounts as extreme, inverting “I 
was doing x …when y” or using “at first I thought.….and then I realised”, using 
supernatural metaphors and portraying situated irrational thinking. These amongst 
others, are ways of making the account appear as more credible. On managing 
irrationality as well as immodesty, depicting this kind of temporary, within-zone 
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irrationality not only verifies and evidences that you were in the zone, but also, by 
contrast, that you were perfectly rational when not in it, such as now, when telling the 
zone narrative.  Lastly, as the zone is a highly subjective experience, whatever its 
evidential grounds, it is difficult to challenge someone that they were not in it. 
 
Rhetorical uses of the zone 
Throughout the paper, a number of rhetorical uses have been identified as parts 
of zone accounts. These have been dealt with in the analysis but it is useful to consider 
them briefly all together. The first relates to the zone being constructed as an 
unconscious state, whereby the athlete does not remember what occurred, and 
contrasting this directly with research that is attempting to consciously put athletes 
into the zone. By constructing the zone as unconscious it acts as a way of diluting 
agency for the athletes when accounting for their successful performances, in that they 
had no knowledge or control over their actions. In direct contrast to this, athletes are 
also, as is the case with Redmond’s narrative, able to construct the zone as conscious 
and be able to report thoughts and feelings throughout it.  In addition, in the sport 
psychology literature the zone is constructed as being potentially controllable, yet in 
the accounts given by the athletes in this paper, the zone is constructed as being 
automatic and not controllable, as something that just overtook them. Again, this is 
linked to its use in diluting agency when accounting for performance. The zone 
invokes a mind-body dualism. At times the zone constructs mind and body as separate 
entities, at others, they are constructed as working together in harmony. A last 
rhetorical usage is the irrationality that is portrayed when talking about being in the 
zone, marked by the uses of extreme metaphorical language. This is starkly contrasted 
with the rationality displayed by those when telling zone accounts, that is they 
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construct themselves as rational people, not disposed to making extreme claims who 
found themselves in an extraordinary situation.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has provided a discursive psychological analysis of the zone, a term 
that is evident within both sport psychological theory and practical discourse. The 
analysis demonstrates how the zone can be used as one way to account for athletic 
performance, which elsewhere has been shown to be interactionally difficult (Locke 
2004). It does so by providing athletes with a way in which to remove agency for their 
accounts of exceptional performances. Through the rhetorical contrasts that the 
flexibility of the zone and flow state concepts make available to speakers 
(unconscious-conscious, irrationality, in control-out of control, mind-body separation 
and dualism), they are able to talk about real (Gunnell) or potential (Redmond) 
success without appearing to be making immodest claims.  
With regards to sport psychology’s typical quantitative and realist treatment of 
mental concepts, this paper demonstrates what a qualitative, discursive psychological 
approach can offer to the further development of research into zone and flow states. In 
particular, viewing zone stories as situated accounts of performance set up to manage 
accountability, rather than say, treating accounts as evidence of the zone’s existence. 
By its neglect of social and cultural ideas, sport psychology as an academic and 
practical discipline, at times lacks a kind of common-sense ecological validity. By 
ignoring these wider cultural and methodological perspectives it has failed at times to 
grasp the bigger picture. An example of where this is apparent is on its study of 
emotion.  Anxiety was regarded for many years as the critical factor for sporting 
performance (e.g. Martens et al, 1990). After a decade or more of researching this, 
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anxiety researchers split the concept into facilitative (good) and debilitative (bad) 
anxiety (Burton, 1988; Jones & Swain, 1992). After another round of studies, many 
began to question whether anxiety was the only important emotion or one of many 
(Prapavessis & Grove, 1994; Jones, 1995), and only in 2005 was a preliminary 
research tool created to measure different emotions that may effect sporting 
performance (Jones et al., 2005), this new questionnaire having a striking resemblance 
to the old anxiety questionnaires. Arguably, if sport psychology as a discipline had 
been less concerned with being ‘scientific’, most often translated into research as 
quantitative, and instead had looked outside its discipline to other work on emotion 
and its social and cultural links, progress towards emotions in sport may have been 
made much sooner. Even now, with this new scale, the interactional currency of 
emotion terms in performance narratives is ignored.  
As has been claimed elsewhere (Sparkes & Partington, 2003), more analytical 
diversity is needed within sport psychology in order to reach a greater understanding 
of sporting experience. With the case of anxiety and emotion research, Locke (2003) 
noted how athletes used emotion discourse as part of their accounts of performance, 
claiming that poor performances stemmed from a lack of emotional experience. Much 
as discursive psychology did for social psychology as a discipline in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, due to the implicit Cartesian dualist notions that surround the subject 
matter of sport psychology, the application of discursive approaches to its subject 
matter will enable a much needed reworking of it as a discipline. This paper aims to 
take a step towards doing just that.  
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Appendix : Zone data 
 
The following two extracts are the full extract transcribed from the Equinox programme “Losing It”. 
 
Equinox: Brian Moore/Sally Gunnell  
1 BM:  ((glossing)) sports scientists have long acknowledged the 
2  importance of total mental control (.) yet few before 
3  have tried to measure it (.) the reason is simple (.) its 
4  an intensely personal (.) almost mystical experience 
5  (4.0)  
6  in nineteen ninety three (.) as she prepared for the 
7  world championships in Stuttgart(0.8) Sally Gunnell (0.2) 
8  was suffering from a cold (.)  
9 SG:  to me it’s all the >sort of< (0.2) the way you portray  
10  yourself before hand y’know its very important that  
11  you’re giving off very (0.2) positive vibes so I would  
12  y’know make sure that no one could hear me cough and  
13  (.) make sure I was still wandering around feeling y’know  
14  yeah this is it y’know you’ve gotta run against me  
15  and I’m feeling good here  
16  ((clips)) 
17  it was all like acting almost (.) y’know I was trying  
18  to just (.) create this character and try and push down  
19  the (.) the little negative me inside that was heh y’know  
20  was really y’know not quite right sort of thing  
21  (0.4) and then by the time I’d got to the line  
22  and w- >y’know< we’re talking (1.0) five ten seconds  
23  before hand constantly y’know saying this is it (.) go  
24  for it (.) y’know you might never get this chance again 
25 BM:  ((glossing)) Gunnell was drawn in lane four (0.8) her  
26  great rival (0.2) the American Sandra Farmer-Patrick (.) 
27  was just outside her in lane six  
28  ((clips)) 
29 SG:  it’s weird really but u:m (0.2) yo:u (1.0) totally forget 
30  everything (.) I I can’t really (.) recall why I mean its 
31  probably only ever happened to me probably twice in my  
32  whole (0.6) career  
33  ((clips)) 
34 SG: but I don’t (0.8) ever remember (0.8) coming off (.)  
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35  the last  (1.0) hurdle and and knowing that she was there 
36  (.) and this is what happened she was actually right  
37  ahead of me and she was ahead of me all the way in but I 
38  don’t (0.6) remember this and it was only me sort of like 
39  fighting and going over the line and (0.8) y’know I  
40  stood over the line and it was like (1.0) my life was  
41  almost starting again (.) it had almost been on hold for 
42  that last (0.4) y’know fifty two (.) seven seconds  
43  ((clips)) 
44 SG: and it was like well what’s happened (.) y’know I  
45  didn’t know that I’d actually won (.) and that I’d  
46  actually broken the world record everyone thought oh  
47  she’s very calm y’know (.) she’s just walking around  
48  (0.2) but I was looking to see you know what actually  
49  happened in that race (.) I had no idea it was as though 
50  I’d just run my own (.) >y’know< (.)  tunnel vision all 
51  the way round I don’t remember any of it  
52  ((clips)) 
53 SG: it seemed like (.) ages until actually you know the  
54  commentator (.) had had actually announced >and the  
55  announcement said< y’know Sally Gunnell new world record 
56  holder world champion  
57  ((clips)) 
58 BM:  at that point you woke up 
59 SG:  yeah it was a little bit like that (.) it was a little  
60  bit um (0.2) like waking up (.) u:m (.) I think the thing 
61  is that (.) in my mental preparation beforehand (.) u::m 
62  (.) y’know I go over the race so many times with me  
63  winning (0.2) a:nd (.) I think because I go over it so  
64  many times (.) it is almost like a tape recording and  
65  once I get out there and run the race (.) I feel very  
66  much I suppose you- you’re getting in to ya (0.2)  
67  subconsciousness in your mind that y’know I’ve been  
68  there before 
69  ((clips)) 
70 BM:  and its almost like a religious experience  
71 SG:  yeah you feel as though someone’s almost (.) helping you 
72  I must admit just because it (.) it does feel so alien  
73  (.) at times (.) y’know as I said before it  
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74  doesn’t actually (.)  particularly feel like (.) me out 
75  there and you almost get into its like a tr↑a↓nce (.) and 
76  uh you feel as though someone y’know I always said (.)  
77  someone’s watching you and just sort of like you know (.) 
78  pulling you round (.) the track and and and (0.2) and  
79  letting you flow around that track yeah it’s a yeah (.) 
80  it is (.) an amazing feeling 
81 BM:  what Sally Gunnell had just experienced was a state of  
82  mind now recognised by most sports scientists (.) as the 
83  key to top performance under stress (.) it’s often  
84  referred to as the zone  
 
((commercial break)) 
 
Equinox: Brian Moore/Derek Redmond  
1 BM:  athletes who’ve got in to the zone (.) have managed to  
2  compartmentalise and control their minds (0.2) to what  
3  scientists regard as an extraordinary degree (.) it’s no 
4  wonder it’s something that few ever really experience  
5  (4.0)  
6  but imagine if you achieve that ultimate state (0.2) yet 
7  had its rewards (.) snatched from you  
8  (2.0)  
9  despite a career plagued by injury (.) Derek Redmond  
10  began the semi-final of the four hundred metres in  
11  Barcelona in nineteen ninety two (0.4) 
12  as a strong favourite (0.4) not only for a  
13  final place (0.6) but for a medal 
14 DR:  I was in the zone heh heh heh heh I was (.) everything  
15  had gone right (.) yeah at the start I said on your marks 
16  ((clips)) 
17 DR: and I knew I’d won it 
18  ((clips)) 
19 DR: mentally I’d (0.2) I’d won the race  
20  ((clips))  
21 DR: and I was just (.) floating down the back straight I felt 
22  like I was running on air (.) I look at the film now (.) 
23  just the way I was running was absolutely brilliant  
24  ((clips))  
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25  and all of a sudden I heard a (0.2) what I thought was a 
26  g↑un shot from the crowd (.) u::m (.) carried on running  
27  next thing you know (.) (that-) I thought somebody had  
28  shot me and I thought I’d been shot in the back of the  
29  l↑eg and (0.4) that was it y’know your hamstring  
30  goes there’s nothing you can do you go up and you come  
31  straight back down again (.) game over  
32  ((clips))  
33 DR:  I remember (0.2) getting up (0.2) and thinking if you get 
34  up now (.) you can still qualify (.) and they’ve got  
35  fifty metres to go and they’re all flying (.) I’ve got  
36  two hundred and fifty metres to go and three hamstrings 
37  (.) and I’m still thinking that I can qualify [I ] 
38 BM:             [you]  
39  really believed that you could still get through  
40 DR:  >if you had come up to me then and said I’d bet you  
41  anything you won’t<  (.) you- you can’t qualify I would 
42  have said (.) you’re on (.) I honestly felt (.) I 
43  could still qualify (.)  
44 BM:  ((glossing)) Redmond was so deeply in the zone (.) that 
45  his mind simply refused to accept what his body was  
46  telling him  
47  ((clips)) 
48 DR:  the next thing I know someone puts their hands round my 
49  shoulders as we’re coming round the bend and I tried to 
50  flick their (.) flick their arms off  
51  ((clips)) 
52 DR: and I heard my dad say look it’s me it’s me (.) you know 
53  you don’t have to do this (0.2) I turned round and said 
54  (0.2) I do  
55  ((clips))  
56 DR: he said to me well look we started everything together  
57  (0.2) we’ll finish this race together (0.2) a:nd (0.4) at 
58  that point I couldn’t hold it in any more and like (.)  
59  everything came out  
60  ((clips)) 
61 BM:  did you feel (0.2) cheated in a sense 
62 DR:  o::h (.) pissed off (.) cheated (.) gutted (.) yeah  
63  I really thought (.) I was owed something by somebody but 
64  I didn’t know who (.) u:m (.) and I really wanted the  
  
 
47
65  whole world of athletics to stop until I got myself back 
66  in shape and then we can all carry on again  
67  ((clips))  
68 DR: y’know if I had a wis:h (0.4) most people’s  
69  wish would be to have y’know all of the money in the  
70  world (.) my actual wish would be to go back (.) and  
71  finish that race (.) there’s (1.0) absolutely  
72  nothing I can do about it 
73  ((clips)) 
74  there is definitely a part of me that (.) y’know is  
75  dead and buried and (.) I’ll never really (0.4) y’know  
76  (0.2) get to see it again (.) and I’ll never get that (.) 
77  particular situation of those athletes at that time (.) 
78  all in that shape (.) its gone for ever (0.2) y’know and 
79  there’s (1.0) nothing I can do about it  
80 BM:  ((glossing)) Redmond (.) never ran again (.) he’d won the 
81  battle with his mind (.) only for his body to let him  
82  d↓own (0.8) when the best in sport step out to  
83  perform (.) they push their bodies and minds to limits  
84  (.) the rest of us regard as superhuman (.) but if for  
85  all their efforts they fail (.) their anguish and pain  
86  reminds us that they are (.) after all (.) still mortal  
 
((end of programme)) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 When my initial interest began on the zone, I searched the Oxford English Dictionary and found 
reference to different usages of the word “zone”, these included geographical (climate/temperate 
zones), regions, (town) planning, football/basketball specific regions on the court, and references to 
zoology – a growth or structure surrounding some part in the form of a ring (Oxford English Dictionary 
1989, Second Edition), but no mention of the word zone in the context of its usage in the current paper. 
Whilst writing this paper however, and looking at the Oxford English Dictionary again, it appears that 
in December 2002 under “draft addition” it added the following: 
 
“colloq. (orig. U.S. Sport). A state of perfect concentration leading to optimum mental or physical 
performance. Chiefly with the, esp. in the zone”.  
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ii
 The analysis offered here neither endorses nor rejects the ‘reality’ of the zone as described by athletes, 
sports psychologists and commentators. The discursive psychological perspective presented in this 
paper differs in focus from sports psychological analysis in that it does not begin by treating the zone as 
a ‘real’ phenomenon, or athletes’ narratives as ‘actual’ descriptions of events. Instead, it treats their 
accounts of being in the zone as situated talk, performing specific interactional business. The main 
theme is that the zone, whatever else it may be, is a discursive resource used by both athletes and sports 
psychologists, in their accounts of performance, and it is this discourse phenomenon that is under 
investigation here. One strand of interest in discursive psychology is to explore the discursive usage of 
the psychological thesaurus (Edwards, 2004) As Edwards suggests  “[o]nce we start to appreciate the 
rich and systematic uses to which everyday psychological concepts are put, their status as potentially 
inaccurate pictures of a real mental life going on behind the scenes becomes irrelevant and 
misconceived” (Edwards, 2004: 263). 
 
iii
 This tension between theory and practice is still clearly evident in the sports psychology literature. 
For example, in the recent debate on attribution theory in the journal Psychology of Sport and Exercise 
between Rees, Ingledew & Hardy (2005a, 2005b) and the discursive critique provided by Faulkner & 
Finlay (2005).  
 
iv
 For a recent debate on the bounds of agency, refer to Hollway & Jefferson (2005) and the 
commentary by Wetherell (2005).  Discursive psychology addresses typical psychological concerns 
such as agency or intentionality (Edwards, 2006) as speaker concerns.  
 
v
 There are issues of editing with the Equinox data as although it appears to be sequentially organized to 
sound like continuous turn taking, it is important to consider that some talk sequences may have been 
constructed as such by the editing team.  However, as the purpose of this paper is on the rhetorical 
organization and the construction of zone accounts, rather than a conversation analytic concern with a 
sequential analysis, this does not affect issues raised in this particular analysis. Indeed the categories of 
‘real’ and ‘naturalistic’ data and what specifically constitutes them is of huge debate in the social 
sciences (see Lynch, 2002; Potter, 2002; Speer, 2002; ten Have, 2002). The full accounts, including the 
programme narrator’s introduction to them, are situated in the appendices.  
 
Potter (1996) discusses the role of edited television documentaries with a specific regard to category 
entitlements, i.e. who is able to speak knowledgably and competently about a specific topic. In the case 
of the Equinox data here, we can clearly see how this category entitlement is played out, particularly as 
the build up to the athletes’ accounts by Brian Moore, the programme’s narrator, is included.   
 
vi
 There is an indication of editing here by the documentary makers as Gunnell here refers to “she” and 
here she is talking about her rival, Sandra Farmer Patrick whom Brian Moore has previously introduced 
as her main rival in the race. 
 
vii
 Whilst giving her narrative of the race, Gunnell is sitting in an auditorium watching the race on the 
screen. Redmond’s narrative is produced under the same conditions. 
 
viii
 In the data presented by Jefferson (2004, 133-134) based on previous work by Harvey Sacks, is an 
example which is very similar in content to Redmond’s account, but one that follows the typical pattern 
of mundane thoughts before extraordinary events. The example is taken from “The Witnesses” and 
concerns  a claim that on hearing a loud sound thought it was a motorbike backfiring (first thought) 
before realising that someone had been shot.  
 
As Jefferson notes “ a reported first thought recurrently constituted an innocuous, ordinary alternative 
to an extraordinary reality” (Jefferson, 2004: 137). She noted that the use of the initial “at first I 
thought” formulations concerns the typically extraordinary events that they are around and often 
concerns witnesses speaking on the record, perhaps for the mass media. 
